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A Model of Entrepreneurial Autonomy in Franchised Outlets:  




Entrepreneurial autonomy amongst franchisees is a persistent management challenge. 
Empirical synthesis is lacking on its drivers, its consequences, and how it can be integrated 
with the standardization requirements in franchise systems. Various theoretical and empirical 
studies have stressed that merging franchisee autonomy with the franchisor’s desire for 
uniformity is extremely difficult. This paper aims to provide a systematic review of the 
relevant empirical studies in order to identify a range of influences, controls, outcomes, and 
associated moderating and mediating factors which offer a better representation of what 
contributes to the understanding of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. By drawing together 
findings from a broad range of theoretical perspectives, the evidence was used to develop a 
comprehensive model of entrepreneurial autonomy in franchised outlets. The model does not 
only provide a structure that brings together prior studies but also identifies the less 
researched areas that can advance the management literature on the notion of autonomy in 
franchising. The research and practitioner implications of the review, as well as its limitations 
and possible directions for future studies, are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Although the entrepreneurial autonomy of the franchisor is undisputed, studies relating to 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy have been split, complicated and continue to be strongly 
debated (e.g. Darr et al. 1995; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Bradach 1997; Kaufmann and 
Eroglu 1998; Sorenson and SØrensen 2001; Yin and Zajac 2004; Barthélemy 2008; Davies et 
al. 2011; Zachary et al. 2011; Dada and Watson 2012, 2013; Nijmeijer et al. 2014; 
Evanschitzky et al. 2016; Watson et al. 2016). As entrepreneurial autonomy and franchising 
are diametrically opposed concepts, many have questioned how entrepreneurial autonomy 
amongst franchisees can be aligned with the standardization requirements on which the 
franchise system is built (for discussions, see Kaufmann and Eroglu 1998; Dant and 
Gundlach 1999; Birkeland 2002; Pizanti and Lerner 2003; Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Paik and 
Choi 2007; Hoy 2008; Ketchen et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; López‐Bayón and López‐
Fernández 2016). There has been no known attempt to juxtapose empirical findings to 
produce a systematic review as to how franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy is positioned in 
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terms of relevance. The present paper aims to address this gap in the literature by providing a 
systematic review of empirical studies in order to identify a range of influences, controls, 
outcomes, and moderating and mediating factors, which offer a better representation of what 
contributes to the understanding of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. 
Autonomy is an established concept in the management literature (Lumpkin et al. 
2009). “In an organizational context, it refers to action taken free of stifling organizational 
constraints” (Lumpkin and Dess 1996: 140). Although several types of autonomy have been 
conceptualized (e.g. Langfred 2004, 2005; Caza 2012), the present paper focuses on 
‘entrepreneurial’ autonomy, which underpins many of the management challenges in 
franchising1. Drawing on Lumpkin et al. (2009), franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy is here 
defined as the extent to which franchisees are able to exercise independence of thoughts and 
actions to operate freely outside the standardized confines of the franchise system. It could be 
argued that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy can lead to improved performance, as 
autonomy when it occurs in the form of franchisee innovation can benefit the franchisor, in 
terms of increased local market adaptability and increased chain-wide innovation (Combs et 
al. 2004b). However, franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy is widely frowned upon as it can 
lead to franchisee non-compliance (Weaven et al. 2010; Davies et al. 2011); deviation from 
the franchisor’s proven standards (Cox and Mason 2007); franchisee free riding (Kidwell et 
al. 2007); loss of corporate identity, trademark erosion and quality deterioration (Cox and 
Mason 2007; Paik and Choi 2007).  
It is therefore evident that the notion of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy raises 
several questions. The major contribution of the present review is the building of a 
comprehensive model which draws together empirical evidence from diverse theoretical 
                                                          
1 This article focuses on business format franchising, which “occurs when a firm (the franchisor) sells the right 
to use its trade name, operating systems, and product specifications to another firm (the franchisee)” 




perspectives to identify the core factors and the associated secondary factors that are 
important for understanding franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy.  
Two notable reviews on franchising have appeared recently in the management 
literature – the papers by Combs et al. (2011) and Nijmeijer et al. (2014). Combs et al.’s 
(2011) review focused on recent insights about franchising, its causes, its effects and factors 
that shape these relationships, as well as the implications of a multidisciplinary perspective 
for franchising research. In the other review by Nijmeijer et al. (2014), they focused on 
collecting all the empirical evidence on the factors that make franchising work and to bring 
this evidence together in an integrative framework. Unlike both of these studies which have a 
broad focus, the present review differs in that it focuses on one persistent management 
challenge in franchising, i.e., franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. This gap in our 
understanding is important because franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy goes against the 
essence of franchising, which is centred on uniform replication of the franchisor’s proven 
business concept in different locations (Dada et al. 2012; Dada and Watson 2012, 2013). 
In the next section of the paper, the methodology adopted for the review is discussed, 
prior to presenting the results. The implications, limitations, directions for future research, 
and conclusion of this review are discussed in the final sections of the paper. 
 
Methodology 
This paper employed a systematic literature review methodology (Cook et al. 1997; Tranfield 
et al. 2003; Denyer and Neely 2004; Pittaway et al. 2004; Thorpe et al. 2005) which focused 
on identifying key scientific contributions, and developing an evidence base that exceeds 
those of a single study (Hakala 2011). This methodology was suitable because it enabled 
development of a reliable knowledge stock by synthesizing prior research in a transparent and 
scientific manner (Tranfield et al. 2003). It addresses weaknesses of traditional narrative 
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reviews which have been criticized for lack of rigor, as the selection of studies for inclusion 
are subject to researchers’ bias (Tranfield et al. 2003).  
 
Data collection 
(i) Inclusion criteria. To determine the studies to include in this review, three categories of 
inclusion criteria were employed, following Wang and Chugh (2014). These comprised 
determining the search boundaries, identifying the search terms, and specifying the coverage 
period. First, the search boundaries were set as electronic databases namely, ABI/INFORM 
Complete (ProQuest), Business Source Premier, JSTOR, ScienceDirect, Web of Science and 
Wiley Online Library. Second, the search terms identified were the dominant additional 
terminologies utilized in the literature to capture franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. These 
were franchisee independence, innovation, creativity, invention, adaptation, new ideas, new 
opportunities, initiatives, flexibility, entrepreneurial orientation, entrepreneurial behavior, 
entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurship (e.g. Darr et al. 1995; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; 
Bradach 1997; Sorenson and SØrensen 2001; Yin and Zajac 2004; Barthélemy 2008; Akremi 
et al. 2011; Davies et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Dada and Watson 2012, 2013; Nijmeijer et 
al. 2014). Third, the search coverage period encompassed articles published up to December 
2013. 
 
(ii) Search strategy. The Title and Abstract fields of the above electronic databases were 
searched, similar to Wang and Chugh (2014), as these fields typically contain the keywords.2 
The search was undertaken for publications in peer-reviewed academic journals that had full 
texts and which were written in English. Consistent with many systematic reviews, only 
                                                          
2  Web of Science does not have an Abstract in its Field Tags. Therefore, the Web of Science search involved 





journal articles were included because of the ranking of evidence from these knowledge 
sources. As noted by Keupp et al. (2012: 369), “journal articles can be considered validated 
knowledge and are likely to have the highest impact on the field”. The search terms in the 
above sub-section were employed in the electronic databases to obtain articles published up 
to December 2013. Truncation was used in the search terms to find all relevant articles that 
had variants of the words i.e. the search contained franchis* AND each of the following 
words consecutively: autonom*, independ*, innovat*, creat*, invent*, adaptat*, new*, idea*, 
opportunit*, initiat*, flexib* and entrepreneur*. To ensure that no relevant study was omitted, 
the reference lists of the selected articles were checked, searches using variants of the 
keywords were undertaken in Google Scholar, and a final broader search for articles that had 
variants of franchise in their titles was conducted in the above electronic databases by using 
franchis* as a general search term. The overall search strategy generated an initial sample 
comprising 1,071 articles. 
 
(iii) Exclusion criteria. The above initial sample was subject to further evaluation based on 
the following exclusion criteria. First, duplicates were removed. Then, non-empirical articles 
were excluded because the focus of this review was on empirical literature, i.e. studies that 
were based on data collection and analysis, and that used either quantitative and/or qualitative 
methods. Articles that were not based on business format franchising, which is the focus of 
this study, were excluded (these included articles on product distribution franchising, rail 
franchises and sports franchises). Articles that just had reference to franchise but which were 
not focused on research within the franchising context were removed. Also excluded were 
articles that focused on international franchising alone. This is because unlike franchising 
within a domestic market, expansion through international franchising requires different 
dynamics (Nijmeijer et al. 2014). With regards to franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, the 
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environmental differences in international contexts may drive the need for substantial 
adaptations in order for the business model to be viable (Winter et al. 2012). Finally, articles 
that were not applicable to this study’s aim were excluded (although the search terms were 
present, the discussions in these articles were not focused on franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy). These exclusion criteria led to a final sample of 49 articles that was utilized for 
the systematic review. 
 
Data analysis 
Content analysis was used to analyze the data, consistent with several systematic literature 
reviews (e.g. Sirola-Karvinen and Hyrkäs 2006; Engström et al. 2007; Davey et al. 2009; 
Germain and Cummings 2010). Recent years have seen widespread acceptance of studying 
management knowledge via systematic reviews of academic journals using content analysis 
(Cetindamar et al. 2009), which has been defined as “the systematic, objective, quantitative 
analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002: 1). Content analysis is a powerful data 
reduction technique for analyzing large bodies of text (Stemler 2001; Prasad 2008). It 
involves “establishing categories and systematic linkages between them, and then counting 
the number of instances when those categories are used in a particular item of text” 
(Silverman 2013: 443). This aids identification of dominant findings and generalizations 
(Mays et al. 2005).  
The content analysis in this review was undertaken manually. First, the (content) 
categories were identified and defined in terms of the aim of the study (Prasad 2008). 
Developing the categories to be used for classification is central to content analysis; this can 
be done via preliminary examination on a small-scale (Prasad 2008). To enhance reliability, 
half of the papers in the final sample were initially analyzed in order to develop the categories 
(Heeks and Bailur 2007). These were the papers deemed to have had the highest impact, in 
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terms of the number of citations derived from Google Scholar. The development of the 
categories was iterative as they were slightly revised, and a few more categories included, 
after reading the entire articles in the final sample (Stemler 2001; Heeks and Bailur 2007). By 
evaluating all the 49 papers in order to determine the final categories, it was possible to 
control for biases. Overall, the selected studies were classified into main categories and sub-
categories (Sirola-Karvinen and Hyrkäs 2006). Second, the units of analysis (i.e. the smallest 
units of content that were to be coded into the main categories and sub-categories) were 
decided: these comprised words or terms, themes and concepts (Berg 2001; Prasad 2008). 
Third, the units of analysis were coded into the main and sub-categories, based on their 
common characteristics (Cummings et al. 2010). As an example, ‘positive outcomes’ is a 
main category; ‘financial and non-financial performance’ is a sub-category of positive 
outcomes. Units of analysis such as ‘performance of the franchise network’, ‘network 
performance’, and ‘performance outcomes of franchise systems’ which appeared in the 
articles by Dada et al. (2012), Dada and Watson (2013), and Gorovaia and Windsperger 
(2013) were coded into the aforementioned  main and sub-categories. Finally, the 
quantification of the units of analysis was undertaken by using the number of times a given 
unit of analysis appeared in a body of text within the selected articles (Prasad 2008). To 
enable the development of a theoretical model, visual maps were utilized to graphically 
depict the emerging patterns of relationships (Whetten 1989; Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005). 
An example of this was the creation of 4 large diagrams – similar to Figure 1 (which is 
discussed below) – and articles were allocated into their respective positions in the diagrams. 
 
Results – the state of the empirical literature     
Table 1 (see the Appendix) presents a description of the articles in the final sample in 
chronological order. It shows that relevant studies were published over a period of 18 years 
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(1995-2013). The start year for publications coincides with when scholars increasingly started 
promoting franchising as an entrepreneurial organizational form, countering the assumption 
that it is the antithesis of entrepreneurship (Shane and Hoy 1996; Hoy and Shane 1998; 
Kaufmann and Dant 1999).  
The articles in Table 1 were published in journals in diverse domains such as, 
management, organization studies, strategy, marketing, entrepreneurship, economics and 
tourism. Majority of the studies utilized quantitative research designs (n=30), consistent with 
arguments that most franchising studies use quantitative methods (Cox and Mason 2009). 
Qualitative research designs were employed in 13 articles, and 6 articles used mixed methods 
(i.e. quantitative and qualitative). Although prior studies collected data from diverse industry 
sectors, the food industry sector was dominant (n=25). The US (and North America) were the 
most researched in terms of regional focus (n=19).  
As shown in Table 1, various theoretical perspectives were used in the articles. The 
most frequently used perspective was agency theory, employed in 23 studies (47% of the 
sample). This was followed by resource-based theory. These findings are consistent with 
arguments that agency and resource-based perspectives have been dominant in franchising 
research (Combs et al. 2004b; Combs et al. 2009; Gillis et al. 2011). From an agency 
perspective, franchising research examines a contractual relationship wherein the franchisor 
(principal) must delegate authority to the franchisee (agent) (Combs and Ketchen 1999; Paik 
and Choi 2007). Agency theory underpins the literature on franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy perhaps because franchisor and franchisee tend to have different goals, which can 
create possibilities for franchisees to act autonomously according to their self-interests (see 
e.g. Paik and Choi 2007; Gillis et al. 2011). This makes franchising relationships problematic 
as it can result in negative opportunistic behaviors by the franchisee (Akremi et al. 2011). On 
the other hand, the premise of resource-based perspective is on the resources that franchisors 
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can obtain from franchisees (Combs et al. 2011). It suggests that franchisors use franchising 
to leverage franchisees’ capital, and managerial and local knowledge (Combs et al. 2011). In 
this review, resource-based perspective includes resource dependence theory; the latter 
suggests that the franchisor and the franchisee mutually need each other to achieve profits 
(Paik and Choi 2007). Despite the differences between agency theory and resource-based 
theory, both are similar in that they demonstrate franchisees’ entrepreneurial role in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, indicating relevance to the study of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. According to agency theory, franchisors are in partnership with 
independent entrepreneurs (i.e. franchisees) who invest their own capital in their franchised 
outlets, are self-motivated, and exhibit self-enforced effort (Barthélemy 2011; Meek et al. 
2011). Likewise, resource-based perspective depicts franchisees as providers of resources – 
e.g. entrepreneurial resources via their local decision-making and their informational capital 
from local markets – which can facilitate rapid growth in franchise systems (Combs et al. 
2004b; Combs et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012).  
In addition to the two prevalent theories (i.e. agency theory and resource-based 
theory), other theoretical perspectives utilized in the articles included contingency theory, 
property rights theory, transaction cost theory, learning perspective, organizational identity 
theory, channel theory, and many others. Twenty two studies utilized more than one 
theoretical perspective, 19 studies used only one theoretical perspective, and the theoretical 
perspectives employed were unknown in 8 studies. The level/unit of analysis (i.e. the 
respondent perspective utilized for analysis) were the franchisee, the franchisor and others. 
Most of the studies employed only one level/unit of analysis, while others used more than one 







Results – a model of factors associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
The review identifies components of, and relationships between, five core factors associated 
with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy: (1) the positive and negative outcomes (2) control 
mechanisms (3) the external and internal influencing factors (4) the internal moderators and 
(5) the internal mediator. These are presented in Figure 1 and the findings are discussed 
below.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The positive and negative outcomes 
Evidence from the review shows two broad categories of outcomes of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy for franchisors and franchisees.3 The first category comprises the 
positive outcomes; the second category comprises the negative outcomes.  
 
(i) Positive outcomes. The benefits of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy were reported in 
17 studies (Darr et al. 1995; Hing 1995; Strutton et al.1995; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; 
Bradach 1997; Jambulingham and Nevin 1999; Pizanti and Lerner 2003; Yin and Zajac 2004; 
Cox and Mason 2007; Weaven and Herington 2007; Flint-Hartle and de Bruin 2011; Gillis et 
al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Dada and Watson 2012, 2013; Gorovaia and Windsperger 2013; 
Melo et al. 2013). 
Six studies (Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Yin and Zajac 2004; Gillis et al. 2011; Dada et 
al. 2012; Dada and Watson 2013; Gorovaia and Windsperger 2013) suggest that franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy is positively related to the financial and non-financial performance 
of franchisors (n=5) and franchisees (n=1). Most of these studies employed agency and 
                                                          
3 For consistency, the outcomes for franchisors reported in the present paper also include outcomes for the 
franchise system, franchise chain, franchise network and franchise organization. 
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resource-based theories, where these theoretical approaches collectively suggest that agents 
(franchisees) provide value to the franchise system as they are a source of entrepreneurial 
resources. Both resource-based and agency theories were equally informative in relation to 
understanding the positive outcomes of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, with neither 
theory being superior to the other. The studies were conducted in the UK (n=2), US (n=2) 
and Germany (n=1); one study used US and Canadian data. Only one study was based on 
multiple (i.e. 13) industry sectors; one study focused on the property services sector; three 
studies were based on the restaurant and fast-food sectors; and one study was conducted 
within the product/distribution and service sector. Four studies employed quantitative 
methods; one study used a qualitative method; and one study employed both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Taken together, the findings from all the studies suggest that franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy may be a mechanism for enhancing franchise system performance. 
Relative to the other studies, the qualitative findings from Dada et al. (2012) provided further 
deeper insights, which showed that the resultant positive performance outcomes aligned with 
franchisees’ motivations for entrepreneurial autonomy; the motivations were mainly the 
pursuit of better returns and for franchised outlets’ success. The authors also found that the 
positive performance outcomes aligned with why franchisors seem to desire franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy, in terms of the benefits for franchise system growth. 
The review further indicates that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy generates 
system-wide adaptations (Darr et al. 1995; Bradach 1997; Cox and Mason 2007; Weaven and 
Herington 2007; Dada et al. 2012; Melo et al. 2013), organizational learning (Bradach 1997; 
Weaven and Herington 2007) and competitive advantage (Flint-Hartle and de Bruin 2011). 
With most of these studies based on agency and resource-based theories, both perspectives 
suggest that franchisees in their role as agents provide resources for franchisors in the form of 
new knowledge often arising from franchisees’ local markets. Again, both agency theory and 
13 
 
resource-based theory were suitable in these contexts. The studies that reported these 
franchisor benefits were conducted in the US (n=2), UK (n=2), Australasia (n=2) and Brazil 
(n=1). Most of these studies employed qualitative methods (n=5); only two studies used a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. One study was based on multiple (i.e. 6) 
industry sectors; three studies were conducted within the restaurant, food and fast-food 
sectors; two studies were based on the property and the real estate brokerage sectors; and one 
study was undertaken within the services sector.  
Evidence from three studies (Hing 1995; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Jambulingham 
and Nevin 1999) indicates that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy enhances franchisee 
satisfaction with the franchisor and contributes to franchisees’ post-purchase satisfaction. 
Additionally, four studies (Strutton et al. 1995; Jambulingham and Nevin 1999; Pizanti and 
Lerner 2003; Dada and Watson 2012) found that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy has a 
positive influence on franchisor-franchisee relationship, including the degree of cooperation 
and solidarity between the franchise partners. Two of these studies draw on agency theory 
(i.e. Jambulingham and Nevin 1999; Pizanti and Lerner 2003), indicating that franchisees that 
are granted autonomy, and those franchisees who have perceptions of autonomy, view the 
relationship they have with their franchisors as a cooperative partnership. All the 
aforementioned positive outcomes were consistent regardless of the respondent perspectives 
utilized for the analysis; one study used the franchisor perspective, three studies were based 
on the franchisee perspective, one study employed the franchise chain and one study used 
both the franchisor and the franchisee perspectives. Overall, these findings suggest that 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy has positive effects on franchisor-franchisee relationship 
quality. Perhaps this is because autonomy enhances franchisees’ motivation to operate their 
outlets (Pizanti and Lerner 2003). Indeed, Jambulingham and Nevin’s (1999: 378) findings 
demonstrate that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy reduces franchisee opportunism i.e. 
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“the extent to which the franchisees act in self-interest in order to achieve their own goals 
despite possible damage to their franchisors”. Relational exchange-based theory was the most 
applied perspective in all the studies here, and the positive outcomes match the emphasis on 
human interactions suggested by exchange theory (Pizanti and Lerner 2003).  
 
(ii) Negative outcomes. Despite the positive outcomes reported above, adverse effects of 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy were reported in four studies for both the franchisee and 
the franchisor (Jambulingham and Nevin 1999; Weaven and Herington 2007; Weaven et al. 
2010; Winter et al. 2012). Irrespective of the country of study, the sectors used for the sample 
and the methodologies employed, the results suggest that franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy increases the risk of franchisee failure, leads to conflict with the franchisor, results 
in losses in scale economies and increases franchisee opportunism. The later findings in 
relation to franchisee opportunism was reported by Jambulingham and Nevin (1999); the 
results indicate that franchisee opportunism can be a positive effect (as shown above in the 
discussions of the positive outcomes) or a negative outcome (as shown in the present 
section), depending on the conceptualization of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. When 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy was measured as franchisees with higher perceived 
innovativeness, this was found to reduce franchisee opportunism (i.e. a positive outcome). 
Conversely, when franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy was measured as franchisees who 
perceive themselves to be risk-takers, this was found to increase franchisee opportunism (i.e. 
a negative outcome). In general, negative outcomes may occur possibly because franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy can be associated with deviation from the franchisor’s template and 
directives, putting strain on the franchisor-franchisee relationship (Weaven et al. 2010; 
Winter et al. 2012). In relation to the negative outcomes, agency theory was the most applied 
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perspective, suggesting that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy can increase agency costs to 
the franchisor (Jambulingham and Nevin 1999). 
 
Control mechanisms 
The positive and negative outcomes point toward the need to understand how franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy can be managed. The review revealed a wide range of mechanisms 
used to control franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Control mechanisms in franchising are 
used to protect the brand name, which is an intangible and essential asset, and to ensure its 
stability when viewed from customers’ perspective (Pizanti and Lerner 2003).  
The control mechanisms, reported in 11 studies (Bradach 1997; Clarkin and Rosa 
2005; Cox and Mason 2007; Weaven and Herington 2007; Cochet and Garg 2008; Cochet et 
al. 2008; Akremi et al. 2011; Flint-Hartle and de Bruin 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Winter et al. 
2012; Melo et al. 2013), can be categorized into two broad types: (i) the formalized control 
mechanisms exercised by franchisors and (ii) the formalized and social control mechanisms 
exercised by franchisees. Majority of these were exercised by franchisors, with franchisees 
exercising control mechanisms only in a few cases.  
 
(i) The formalized control mechanisms exercised by franchisors include the use of franchise 
contract and incentives as guide for, and to restrict, franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
(Bradach 1997; Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Cochet and Garg 2008; Dada et al. 2012); the 
presence of franchise coordinators and franchise managers from the franchisor headquarters 
in franchisee networks (Dada et al. 2012); freedom for franchisees to innovate with the 
franchisor’s permission (Clarkin and Rosa 2005); the need for franchisee innovations to 
follow the franchisor’s guidelines (Dada et al. 2012; Melo et al. 2013); monitoring of 
franchisee adaptations and excessive deviations (Weaven and Herington 2007; Winter et al. 
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2012); the existence of strictly circumscribed sphere where franchisee entrepreneurial 
behaviors are allowed to take place (Cox and Mason 2007; Dada et al. 2012); the use of 
franchisor mechanisms to capture innovations that assist competitive advantage (Flint-Hartle 
and de Bruin 2011); franchisor learning to vigilantly identify, understand, and correct 
franchisee deviations (Bradach 1997); and the franchisor’s use of relational forms of 
governance more intensely where franchisees possess more autonomy, and thus have more 
room for opportunistic behavior (Cochet et al. 2008). Although multiple theories were 
utilized in the studies reported here, agency theory was predominant. The use of agency 
theory may suggest that franchisors utilize control mechanisms to create boundaries for 
franchisee entrepreneurial behaviors, in order to minimize potential undesirable consequences 
(i.e. agency costs). 
 
(ii) The formalized and social control mechanisms exercised by franchisees were reported in 
two studies (Akremi et al. 2011; and Dada et al. 2012). The formalized mechanisms involved 
franchisee representatives, who acted as ‘the voice of the other franchisees’, in 
communicating franchisee initiatives to the franchisor (Dada et al. 2012). These were 
initiatives from franchisee autonomy that were being considered for implementation. 
Franchisees’ social control mechanism involved using cohesion among themselves to 
decrease franchisee deviation from standards (Akremi et al. 2011). This suggests that 
although agency theory assumes that the franchisor (principal) can solely control franchisee 
autonomy, franchisees (agents) may utilize social mechanisms amongst themselves to control 






Influencing factors  
The review indicates two types of factors– external and internal– that influence franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. The external factors comprise industry effect, local conditions and 
local market variations; while the internal factors consist of those from the franchisor and the 
franchisee’s perspectives.  
 
(i) External factors. The effect of environmental forces on franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy was reported in 9 studies (Bradach 1997; Dant and Gundlach 1999; Sorenson and 
SØrensen 2001; Pizanti and Lerner 2003; Paik and Choi 2007; Flint-Hartle and de Bruin 
2011; Hussain and Windsperger 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2013).  
Industry effect was reported in Flint-Hartle and de Bruin (2011) which found that 
acculturation (i.e. assimilation in the first instance into the culture of the industry and then 
that of the franchisor) allows franchisee autonomy in business operation, and the franchise 
system benefits from the resulting innovative practices. 
Qualitative studies conducted in the US and the UK, by Bradach (1997) and Dada et 
al. (2012) respectively, indicate that competition leads to high levels of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. These findings differ from the quantitative study conducted in the 
US by Dant and Gundlach (1999), and the qualitative study undertaken in the US and 
multiple European countries by Paik and Choi (2007) which found that within a franchise 
setting, higher levels of competition will lead to lower levels of franchisees’ desire for 
autonomy.  
In all, the evidence suggests that competition has different impact on franchisors and 
franchisees. When faced with high levels of competition, franchisees use entrepreneurial 
autonomy to respond to competitors (Bradach 1997; Dada et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
with intense competition, franchisors will be prompted to exercise more control because 
18 
 
franchisees may be revealing more information than usual to their franchisors, implying the 
franchisees less desire for autonomy (Dant and Gundlach 1999; Paik and Choi 2007). Indeed, 
Mumdžiev and Windsperger (2013) found that environmental uncertainty has a negative 
effect on the delegation of decision rights to franchisees. This implies that when franchisors 
perceive higher market and demand uncertainty, they impose higher control over local outlet 
decisions, hence reducing franchisees’ influence on decision making (Mumdžiev and 
Windsperger 2013).  
Evidence from Bradach (1997), Pizanti and Lerner (2003) and Hussain and 
Windsperger (2011) suggests that franchisees demonstrate entrepreneurial autonomy in 
response to the demands and requirements of their local markets. This mainly entails adapting 
their product lines and proposing products that were sometimes adopted throughout the 
franchise system (Bradach 1997; Hussain and Windsperger 2011). These findings are 
consistent with those of Sorenson and SØrensen (2001) that franchisees adapt to 
environmental opportunities because they operate under strong incentives to maximize local, 
long-term performance.  
The findings in terms of agency theory, which was the most used perspective here, 
may indicate that franchisees continually look for means to improve their businesses 
(Bradach 1997), which often involves displaying entrepreneurial behaviors by seeking new 
opportunities (Dada et al. 2012). Resource-based theory, which was the second most applied 
perspective here, further complements the agency-based inferences. Since franchisees in their 
role as agents are likely to be more familiar with local market conditions relative to the 
franchisor (Cox and Mason 2007), resource-based explanations suggest that this familiarity 
can influence franchisees to introduce local market knowledge (which is an important 




(ii) Internal factors. These are the organizational forces from the franchisor’s and the 
franchisee’s perspectives that drive franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy.  
 
(a) The influence of the franchisor-drivers on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy was 
reported in 18 studies (Bradach 1997; Falbe et al. 1999; Dickey and Ives 2000; Pizanti and 
Lerner 2003; Yin and Zajac 2004; Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Cox and Mason 2007; Paik and 
Choi 2007; Weaven and Herington 2007; de Azevedo 2009; Flint-Hartle and de Bruin 2011; 
Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011; Zachary et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Winter et al. 2012; 
Berkowitz and Wren 2013; Dada and Watson 2013; Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2013).  
The findings from Falbe et al. (1999), Pizanti and Lerner (2003) and Zachary et al. 
(2011) suggest that the franchisor’s firm size will have a positive influence on franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. This may be linked to the level of franchisor support for franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy in large firms. Falbe et al. (1999) found that large franchisor size 
was positively related to management support for franchisee innovation, including 
recognition. Indeed, franchisor support– which can occur in various forms e.g. via methods 
instituted to encourage entrepreneurial activity in franchised outlets– was reported to have a 
positive influence on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy in the studies by Bradach (1997), 
Falbe et al. (1999), Clarkin and Rosa (2005), and Dada and Watson (2013). The findings in 
relation to agency theory, which was the most applied perspective here, may reflect 
entrepreneurial teamwork in the franchisor-franchisee relationship (Clarkin and Rosa 2005).  
In a study of franchisors and franchisees in North America, Clarkin and Rosa (2005) 
demonstrate the positive influence of a flexible organizational culture on franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. This involved a system that facilitates entrepreneurial teamwork 
between the franchisor and the franchisee, where both partners were free to innovate (Clarkin 
and Rosa 2005). Berkowitz and Wren (2013) reported findings that are somewhat consistent 
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with Clarkin and Rosa (2005). Berkowitz and Wren’s (2013) findings suggest that high levels 
of centralized control by upper management [i.e. the franchisor’s organizational structure] 
lead to lower levels of local control on the part of franchisees. 
The evidence further demonstrates the relationship between age of the franchisor’s 
firm and franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, based on the fast-food sector. The findings 
suggest that franchisees operating in franchise organizations that are in the growth stage tend 
to have more autonomy than those franchisees operating in organizations that are in the 
mature stage (Paik and Choi 2007). It has been argued that the entrepreneurial activity that 
characterizes new organizations tends to disappear as organizations grow older; at the older 
stage, organizations face pressures to increase standardization in order to maintain internal 
consistency (Falbe et al. 1999). This may explain the negative influence of franchisor age on 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Although the direction of influence was not reported in 
the study by Pizanti and Lerner (2003), it was found that the age of the franchise chain 
(which may be veteran or new) would have an influence on control and autonomy in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. The findings here suggest that resource-based theory may 
be better than agency theory in explaining why franchisees have more autonomy when their 
franchisor organizations are in the growth stage. This is because in the growth stage, 
franchisors rely on franchisees’ expertise to help develop the business, consistent with 
resource-based theory (unlike agency theory which focuses on the franchisor’s use of 
coercive power) (Paik and Choi 2007). Resource-based theory suggests that this reliance may 
create a strong collaboration between the franchisor and the franchisee (Paik and Choi 2007). 
In addition, based on organizational identity theory, Zachary et al.’s (2011) findings 
suggest that higher-performing franchisors can have a positive influence on franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy. In order to attract potential franchisees, it was found that these 
franchisors use rhetoric indicative of each dimension of entrepreneurial orientation (namely, 
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autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking) in their 
recruitment Web sites. These findings suggest that franchisors view franchisees as being 
similar to entrepreneurs or prefer those franchisees that are entrepreneurs (Zachary et al. 
2011). Since a major reason for franchising is to grow the franchise, this may explain why 
franchisors would attempt to recruit franchisees that would behave more like entrepreneurs 
than investors (Zachary et al. 2011).  
Two studies from the restaurant and services sectors in the US and Australia suggest 
that the choice of a franchised governance structure (as opposed to a company-owned 
governance structure) will have a positive influence on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
(Yin and Zajac 2004; Weaven and Herington 2007). Each of these studies made reference to 
both agency and resource-based perspectives, which may indicate the complementarities of 
the two theories in studying franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Franchisees provide 
innovations in franchise systems that adopt a plural governance strategy i.e. organizations 
using a mix of company-owned and franchisee-owned outlets (Weaven and Herington 
2007).4 These franchisee innovations can be viewed as outcomes of resources that 
franchisees provide to the system under the resource-based theoretical explanations. The 
incentives rationale of agency theory (Weaven and Herington 2007) also indicate that unlike 
company-owned outlets, franchised outlets are characterized by more decentralized decision 
rights, greater operational flexibility and stronger financial incentives (Yin and Zajac 2004). 
These are features associated with local responsiveness and adaptation (Yin and Zajac 2004), 
which are linked to franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy.  
The research conducted in Israel by Pizanti and Lerner (2003), based on findings from 
a fast-food chain, demonstrates that a complex franchising concept (e.g. in relation to the 
variety of products/services in the franchised outlets), and a long-term (10-year) franchise 
                                                          
4 Most franchise systems use both franchised and company-owned outlets, which is commonly referred to as the 
‘plural form’ (Bradach 1997). 
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contract, promotes franchisee autonomy. Autonomy was allowed at every franchised outlet 
and centralized control was designed to monitor the numerous outlets so as to protect the 
chain’s reputation. These findings indicate that agency theory and exchange theory can be 
used jointly to understand variations of control and autonomy in franchising relationships, as 
these perspectives emphasize formal and dynamic aspects of franchisor-franchisee relations 
(Pizanti and Lerner 2003).   
Using agency and property rights theories, the findings from two quantitative surveys 
of franchise systems in Brazil and Germany suggest that franchisors’ intangible assets  (e.g. 
brand name value) will have a negative relationship with franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy (de Azevedo 2009; Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011). In contrast, franchisees’ 
intangible assets (captured with franchisees’ innovation assets) will have a positive 
relationship with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy (Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011). 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that if franchisors want less franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy, the focus should be on strengthening franchisors’ intangible assets. 
However, if the franchisor desires more franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, the focus 
should be on enhancing franchisees’ intangible assets. Protecting the franchisor’s strong 
intangible assets reflects a need to intensify control across the franchised outlets (de Azevedo 
2009; Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011), thus implying less franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy. On the contrary, residual decision rights tend to be delegated to franchisees when 
they have more intangible assets (i.e. innovation assets) which signifies that the franchisee 
has (less contractible) local market knowledge that is costly to transfer to the franchisor 
(Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2011). This indicates more entrepreneurial autonomy for 
franchisees. Indeed, prior studies suggest that franchisors encourage franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy because of the belief that franchisees might have superior 
knowledge of their local markets (Winter et al. 2012). 
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In another study based on transaction cost theory, Mumdžiev and Windsperger (2013) 
reported that behavioral uncertainty has a positive effect on the delegation of decision rights 
to franchisees (e.g. the strength of franchisees’ influence on product/service offering). This 
implies that franchisors tend to delegate decision rights [autonomy] to franchisees when they 
encounter difficulties in measuring performance of the franchisees and controlling their 
behavior (Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2013). These findings demonstrate that franchisors 
may want more franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy when there are high levels of 
uncertainty in franchisee behavior. 
 
 (b) The influence of the franchisee-drivers on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy was 
reported in 20 studies (Darr et al. 1995; Dant and Gundlach 1999; Grünhagen and 
Mittelstaedt 2005; Maritz 2006; Dickey et al. 2007; Paik and Choi 2007; Weaven and 
Herington 2007; Huang and Phau 2009; Weaven et al. 2009; Weaven et al. 2010; Blut et al. 
2011; Davies et al. 2011; Ketchen et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Altinay et al. 2013; Dant et 
al. 2013a,b; Melo et al. 2013; Paswan and Cheng 2013; Perrigot et al. 2013).  
Positive and negative relationships were found between franchisee ownership 
structures (both single-unit and multi-unit ownership) and franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy (Dant and Gundlach 1999; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005; Maritz 2006; Paik 
and Choi 2007; Weaven and Herington 2007; Ketchen et al. 2011). Three studies suggest that 
franchisees who have multiple outlets are likely to have more entrepreneurial autonomy 
(Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005; Maritz 2006; Ketchen et al. 2011). This is because they 
exploit their entrepreneurial ambitions via the expansion of the franchise (Ketchen et al. 
2011). It has also been found that multi-unit franchisees attach less importance to dependence 
on the franchisor (Dant et al. 2013a). These results align with those reported above for the 
franchisor-drivers in relation to the size of the franchisor’s firm having a positive influence 
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on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. However, in two studies, a negative effect of multi-
unit ownership on franchisees’ desire for autonomy was found (Dant and Gundlach 1999; 
Paik and Choi 2007). The explanations for the negative effect were based on arguments 
indicating that multi-unit franchisees can be viewed as ‘mini-franchisors’ because they are 
responsible for the supervision and management of their own chain of outlets (Dant and 
Gundlach 1999; Paik and Choi 2007). Therefore, multi-unit franchisees appreciate the 
underlying rationale for imposing franchisor control (Dant and Gundlach 1999; Paik and 
Choi 2007) which may in turn drive lower desires for entrepreneurial autonomy. In addition, 
findings from a study where the franchisor was the level of analysis, suggested that single-
unit franchisees enjoy entrepreneurial autonomy as they adapt their product and service 
offerings to meet local demands (Weaven and Herington 2007). This is consistent with 
resource-based explanations on the franchisee being a source of local market knowledge. 
Altogether, the findings reiterate the importance of jointly using agency and resource-based 
perspectives (which were the most applied theories in this instance) when studying franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy.  
Three studies (Paik and Choi 2007; Blut et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012) suggest that the 
age of the franchisee’s firm can influence franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. In the 
qualitative studies by Paik and Choi (2007) and Dada et al. (2012), which were based on the 
fast-food sector and the property services sector respectively, in the US and multiple 
countries in Western Europe, it was found that experience of the franchisee (i.e. the length of 
time spent working within the franchise system) positively influences franchisee’s level of 
autonomy. Partial support for the foregoing findings was reported in Blut et al.’s (2011) 
quantitative study, which was based on multiple industry sectors in Germany. Blut et al. 
(2011) disaggregated the stages of the franchisee’s lifecycle into four: (i) the honeymoon 
stage, i.e. the initial phase, (ii) the routine stage, i.e. the phase when franchisees are 
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confronted with the realities of day-to-day business, (iii) the crossroad stage, i.e. the phase 
when franchisees gradually develop an understanding of the way the system works, and (iv) 
the stabilization stage, i.e. the maturity phase. Consistent with Paik and Choi (2007) and 
Dada et al.’s (2012) findings, Blut et al. (2011) found evidence of high franchisee autonomy 
at the stabilization stage, when franchisees would have acquired substantial experience. 
However, in general, Blut et al.’s (2011) findings revealed that franchisee autonomy will 
display a U-shaped curve that is high in the honeymoon and stabilization stages, but low in 
the routine and crossroad stages. Paik and Choi (2007), Blut et al. (2011) and Dada et al. 
(2012) were based on multiple theories, which may suggest complexities in studying the 
influence of age of the franchisee’s firm on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. 
Nevertheless, reference to resource-based theory was common to all three studies, which may 
imply that franchisees’ accumulated expertise overtime can lead to provision of increased 
informational capital, thereby enabling them to demand/enjoy more autonomy. Unlike the 
results reported earlier in relation to the negative influence of age of the franchisor’s firm on 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, the findings here demonstrate that franchisee autonomy 
varies across the stages of the franchisee’s lifecycle. 
In the quantitative and qualitative studies by Dant and Gundlach (1999), and Paik and 
Choi (2007), it was demonstrated that higher levels of success of the franchisee’s business 
could lead to lower levels of franchisee autonomy. These results differ from those of the 
franchisor-drivers, which suggest that franchisor performance has a positive influence on 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. The negative effect of franchisee’s success on 
autonomy may arise because these franchisees are likely to attribute their success to the 
franchisor’s efforts in successfully overcoming marketplace uncertainty and competition 
(Dant and Gundlach 1999). Successful franchisees may therefore value this rewarding 
franchisor role and may prefer the franchisor to be in control (Dant and Gundlach 1999).   
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In terms of the personalities of individual franchisees, Weaven et al.’s (2010) 
qualitative study, conducted in Australia, indicate that franchisees who sought greater 
independence and autonomy through entering franchising were more likely to exercise 
entrepreneurial autonomy in their operations. This is because these franchisees are less likely 
to comply with system directives (Weaven et al. 2010). Since Weaven et al.’s (2010) study 
was based on conflict, the findings suggest that franchisees with a high desire for autonomy 
may not be appropriate for the franchise system, as they are more likely to strain the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. These align with Dant et al.’s (2013b) study, which was 
based on role-theoretic B2B research; it was found that highly extraverted franchisees (who 
are linked with having high levels of entrepreneurial autonomy) will impede strong 
franchisor-franchisee relationship quality, and may have conflict with the franchisor. 
However, Huang and Phau’s (2009) quantitative study, which was also conducted in 
Australia, demonstrate that franchisees with higher desire for autonomy are likely to be ‘Best 
Buddy Franchisees’ i.e. the model franchisees that are an asset to the franchise system. But it 
was found that franchisees with lower desire for autonomy are likely to be ‘Black Sheep 
Franchisees’ i.e. franchisees who are likely to act opportunistically. As Huang and Phau 
(2009) was based on agency theory, these findings may indicate that having franchisees with 
higher desire for autonomy can minimize agency costs. Overall, the results from Weaven et 
al. (2010) and Huang and Phau (2009) are not consistent in relation to whether it is better to 
have franchisees with high or low desires for autonomy. The findings seem to differ with 
regard to the methodological approaches and the theoretical perspectives adopted. Despite the 
disparities, the results still point to the same fact, i.e. the personalities of franchisees influence 
their entrepreneurial autonomy. These findings support those of Paswan and Cheng’s (2013), 
based on role theory, which found that franchisees’ perception of their roles (such as, when 
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franchisees view themselves as owner-managers) influences the importance they associate 
with expectations of autonomy. 
Prior studies have also explored the influence of franchisor characteristics, as desired 
by franchisees, on franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. In a study by Altinay et al. (2013), it 
was found that when franchisees select franchisors that cannot meet the required task-related 
and partner-related criteria (used by franchisees to select their franchisor partners) it could 
result in franchisees’ need or desire to work autonomously, acting more like independent 
entrepreneurs or mavericks, rather than conforming to the guidelines of the franchise system. 
These results are consistent with those of Dickey et al. (2007) and Davies et al. (2011) which 
suggest that franchisor trust (namely, franchisor overall trust, integrity trust and competence 
trust) negatively influences franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Reference to relational-
based theory was common to both of these studies, which may imply that complex issues that 
are not easily governed by a franchise contract (such as franchisee desire for autonomy) 
may be handled through norms of mutual trust (Dickey et al. 2007; Davies et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, drawing mainly on learning perspective, Darr et al. (1995), Dada et al. 
(2012) and Melo et al. (2013) demonstrate the positive role of franchisee networks (e.g. 
franchisee forums, national forum and regional meetings) on franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy, such as for dissemination of new ideas and discussion of issues relating to 
entrepreneurship. 
Only Perrigot et al. (2013) suggest that the use of the internet by franchisees for 
online selling has a positive impact on their entrepreneurial autonomy. Perrigot et al. (2013) 
demonstrate that when franchisees set up and run their own websites, their autonomy was 
reflected in the lack of uniformity in various dimensions relating to the (1) content and 
structure of the franchisees’ websites and (2) the marketing-mix elements (i.e., products and 





A few studies have explored factors that can moderate some of the relationships associated 
with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Mumdžiev and Windsperger’s (2013) study, 
which was based on transaction cost theory, confirm the moderating role of trust by showing 
that trust increases allocation of decision rights [autonomy] to franchisees as it lessens 
opportunism risk and increases information sharing between the franchisor and the 
franchisees. First, Mumdžiev and Windsperger’s (2013) findings suggest that trust can 
moderate the relationship between environmental uncertainty (an influencing factor) and 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. This means that in a situation of high environmental 
uncertainty, franchisors will transfer more decision rights [autonomy] to franchisees if 
franchisees are perceived to be trustworthy (Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2013). Secondly, it 
was found that trust has a moderating effect on the relationship between behavioral 
uncertainty (an influencing factor) and the franchisor’s propensity to delegate decision rights 
[autonomy] to franchisees. This means that in situations where franchisors find it difficult to 
measure franchisee performance, franchisors have less need to delegate decision rights to 
franchisees, as formal incentives, when they trust their franchisees (Mumdžiev and 
Windsperger 2013). Here, trust reduces the positive effect of behavioral uncertainty on 
franchisee autonomy. 
Furthermore, only Cochet et al. (2008) revealed that franchisee incentive 
characteristics– namely, franchisee success, multi-unit ownership and intra-chain 
competition– will moderate the relationship between relational governance (a control 
mechanism) and franchisee autonomy. More specifically, franchisee success and multi-unit 
ownership will reduce the need for the franchisor’s use of relational governance, and intra-
chain competition will increase the need for the franchisor’s use of relational governance 
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(Cochet et al. 2008). This is because there may be less misuse of autonomy amongst the more 
successful franchisees and multi-unit franchisees, whilst there may be more misuse of 
autonomy amongst franchisees who perceive higher levels of intra-chain competition. The 
findings, which were based on agency theory, suggest that the importance of relational 
governance as a control mechanism for franchisee autonomy varies across different 
franchisee incentive characteristics.  
 Phan et al. (1996) and Grünhagen et al. (2014) demonstrate the moderating roles of 
franchisor-suasion tactics and HR operational autonomy, respectively, in the relationship 
between franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy and franchisor performance. Based on agency 
and strategic theoretical perspectives, Phan et al. (1996) found that franchisor-suasion tactics 
(i.e. the franchisor’s attempts to influence franchisees by means of franchisor’s strategy 
advice) will strengthen the relationship between entrepreneur-franchisee strategy [i.e. 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy] and franchisee performance, resulting in higher levels 
of franchisee sales. This finding implies positive outcomes for the franchisor; unlike 
franchisees who have profit-maximization goals, franchisors have sales maximization goals 
because payment of royalties is based on sales (Phan et al. 1996). Based on a sample of 
franchisors in the UK, and drawing on property rights theory, the quantitative study by 
Grünhagen et al. (2014) indicates that when franchisees are given greater autonomy in HR 
policies, their entrepreneurial orientation (i.e. innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking) 
will have a stronger positive impact on franchise system performance.  
Furthermore, findings from Phan et al. (1996) demonstrate that two factors– notably, 
franchise contract formal goals and franchisor-suasion tactics– may strengthen the negative 
relationship between franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy and franchisee performance. Both 
factors were found to moderate the relationship between entrepreneur-franchisee strategy and 





Only a single study was found to have explored a factor that can mediate relationships 
associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Drawing on learning perspective, 
findings from Darr et al. (1995) suggest that transfer of learning is a mediator in the 
relationship between franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy and resulting positive outcomes. It 
was found that a franchisee’s outlet-level innovation leads to extensive transfer of learning 
between franchisees and franchisors, which in turn leads to system-wide adaptations (of the 
innovation), and/or adaptations to the other outlets owned by the franchisee who originated 
the innovation (Darr et al. 1995). 
 
Discussion 
Since the franchisor has profound interest in enforcing franchisee compliance to operational 
standards and corporate rules, there are many ambiguities surrounding the notion of 
franchisee autonomy (Dant and Gundlach 1999; Davies et al. 2011). This review has 
generated a model that aids better understanding of these issues. The model identifies why 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy might/might not occur in relation to its drivers, how it 
can be relevant/irrelevant in terms of its consequences, how it can be managed by franchisors 
and their franchisees in terms of controls, and what types of factors can strengthen/weaken or 
intervene relationships in the model.   
 
Research implications 
Irrespective of the countries studied, franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy provides positive 
outcomes. Most studies reporting positive outcomes were conducted in the US. Others were 
undertaken in the UK, Australasia, Canada, Israel, Germany and Brazil. Agency and 
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resource-based theories were mostly referenced in studies capturing the positive outcomes of 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. These suggest how agents (franchisees), through their 
autonomy, contribute entrepreneurial resources to the franchise organization. However, 
relational exchange-based theory provided supplementary insights beyond agency and 
resource contributions of franchisees. More specifically, relational exchange-based theory 
provided knowledge on the dynamics of franchisor-franchisee relations that arise as a result 
of franchisee autonomy. 
Only studies conducted in the US and Australia reported negative outcomes. These 
two countries have mature franchising sectors (Dant 2008; Frazer et al. 2012), which suggest 
that they may have more well established franchise systems. Hence, it is possible that the 
negative outcomes in the US and Australia occur because franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy may be associated with franchisee deviating from the tried and tested systems in 
these more established organizations. Indeed, Frazer et al. (2012) noted that most of the 
substantial disputes reported by franchisors occur in larger and older systems, and a main 
cause of dispute include issues related to compliance with the system. Agency theory was 
mostly referenced in studies capturing the negative outcomes, which suggests that this 
theoretical perspective indicates the increased agency costs associated with franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy.  
By drawing on agency theoretic arguments, it is widely believed that contracts are 
used for controlling franchisee behavior. This review, however, revealed wider mechanisms 
for managing entrepreneurial autonomy in franchised outlets. Findings from studies based on 
agency theory, for example, show that franchisors use alternative mechanisms for this 
purpose (e.g. Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Cochet et al. 2008). These imply that franchisors can 
minimize agency costs that may be associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy by 
using a diverse range of mechanisms beyond the contractual agreement.  
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Furthermore, franchisors exercise control mechanisms that reflect their unilateral 
dominance in monitoring franchisees, such that franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy has to 
be in accordance with the franchisor’s guidelines and/or have the franchisor’s approval. In 
contrast, franchisees exercise control mechanisms designed around maintaining a unified 
franchisee network. The evidence shows that social control mechanisms exercised by 
franchisees can complement the formal and contractually-based controls commonly 
examined in the literature (Akremi et al. 2011), which mostly draw on agency theory. 
Franchisors could use formal controls together with social controls because the strict formal 
controls tend to sour relations with franchisees (Akremi et al. 2011).  
This review further identified a range of external and internal drivers of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy, which imply that there is a need for franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy under certain conditions and in different franchising contexts (e.g. Bradach 1997; 
Mumdžiev and Windsperger 2013). In terms of the external influencing factors, agency 
theory and resource-based theory were mostly applied, and were complementary in showing 
how agents’ (franchisees’) conversance with their industry and local market opportunities 
enable introduction of new knowledge (entrepreneurial resources) to franchise systems. In 
relation to the internal influencing factors from the franchisor’s perspective, the following six 
theoretical perspectives were mostly applied: agency theory, resource-based theory, 
organizational identity theory, exchange theory, property rights theory and transaction cost 
theory. Collectively, these theories imply that some franchisors may realize that the 
performance, development and growth of their systems can be influenced positively via 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. In terms of studying the internal influencing factors 
from the franchisee’s perspective, the following six theoretical perspectives were mostly 
referenced: resource-based theory, agency theory, relational-based theory, learning 
perspective, role-based theory and channel theory. Together, these theories show how 
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franchisees’ accrued experience, knowledge and personal profile affect their levels of 
entrepreneurial autonomy. 
This review further shows that the following four theories are appropriate for 
understanding the internal moderators associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy: 
agency theory and strategic perspective (captures the moderating effect of franchisee 
incentive characteristics, franchise contract formal goals, and franchisor’s attempts to 
influence franchisees by means of franchisor’s strategy advice); transaction cost theory 
(captures the moderating effect of trust); and property rights theory (captures the moderating 
effect of HR operational autonomy). 
Only learning perspective was found to have been applied for understanding the 
internal mediator associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. This perspective 
captures the transfer of learning that intervenes the relationship between franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy and the associated positive outcomes. 
 Table 2 summarizes the strengths of agency theory, resource-based theory and the 
other mostly used theoretical perspectives discussed above, in relation to the core factors 
associated with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Although diverse theoretical 
perspectives were found to be informative in this review, agency theory appears to be the best 
approach for capturing the various phenomena in the model of franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy. Agency theory was consistently effective in providing knowledge on each of the 
individual dimensions of the model, with the exception of only one dimension (internal 
mediator). This might explain why it has been widely used in prior studies of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy.  
 





By establishing autonomy, managers demonstrate to organizational members that they have 
confidence in their ability to perform effectively outside the rubric of firm boundaries 
(Hughes and Morgan 2007). The present review identifies factors that franchisors can employ 
to boost their understanding of, and confidence in, franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. 
Franchisors interested in encouraging franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy can utilize the 
results to identify influencing factors that can provide directions for both franchise partners. 
The control mechanisms identified in the model can be used by franchisors to have a clearer 
understanding of how autonomy can be sustained without damaging the standardization on 
which franchising is designed. The control mechanisms can also help franchisees to 
understand how they can manage their entrepreneurial autonomy to fit the franchisor’s 
requirements. The effectiveness of the control mechanisms was noted in four of the studies in 
this review. Where franchisees exercised autonomy by using control mechanisms as a guide, 
the mechanisms reduced the need for the franchisor’s involvement in terms of control 
(Bradach 1997). The control mechanisms also promote supportive and cooperative 
franchisors (Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Dada et al. 2012) and maintain standardization amongst 
franchisees (Akremi et al. 2011; Dada et al. 2012; Melo et al. 2013). The model suggests that 
franchise organizations that foster franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy may differ from those 
that do not, in terms of the organizational outcomes. These results set a context for 
practitioners to appreciate the value of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy, while exercising 
caution to prevent negative outcomes. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Despite the contributions of this study, it has potential limitations that provide opportunities 
for future research (Michael and Combs 2008). First, although this study was based on a 
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systematic review, it is impossible to guarantee an absence of publication bias (Nijmeijer et 
al. 2014). However, in searching and selecting the articles to be included in this review, 
various strategies were employed (as outlined in the methodology section) to minimize bias 
in the final sample utilized for this study. Second, the results indicate that some theoretical 
perspectives were utilized more than others; these might have limited the inferences derived 
from this review. Third, as the present study excluded articles that were solely focused on 
international franchising, this might limit the relevance of the findings for franchisors that 
operate in international markets.  
In terms of future research, studies that will examine the optimal levels of franchisee 
entrepreneurial autonomy are required to aid understanding of this research area. For 
example, research can explore which of the different influencing factors provide optimal 
levels of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. It is worth comparing the optimal levels of 
franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy in different countries. Additionally, researchers can 
explore more about the underlying dynamics behind the negative outcomes reported in the 
US and Australia. It would be interesting to see reviews on franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy within the context of international franchising. Exploring how these differ from a 
domestic market context, and the factors that drive these differences, may enable 
understanding of the level of leeway to be provided to franchisees depending on their 
geographical locations.  
Some of the core factors in the model– notably, the moderating and mediating 
factors– have received less research attention. Studies focusing on these under-researched 
areas might advance our knowledge of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Additionally, 
despite evidence showing the use of a wide range of control mechanisms, little is known 
about their efficacy. Comparative studies can be designed to examine the value of the control 
mechanisms, e.g., whether the control mechanisms exercised by franchisors are more/less 
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effective than those exercised by franchisees, and whether formal control mechanisms are 
more/less effective than social control mechanisms. Furthermore, most of the studies 
employed quantitative research designs, more qualitative studies are required to examine the 
intricacies of entrepreneurial autonomy in franchising. 
Although a wide range of theories was adopted in prior studies, some perspectives 
remain dominant (i.e. agency and resource-based theories). The less applied theories (e.g. 
stewardship theory, tournament theory, U-curve theory and institutional theory) can provide 
directions for future research. Scholars can draw together agency and stewardship theories, in 
a complementary framework, to examine how the franchisor’s role as principal affects the 
level of autonomy granted to franchisees when the latter are viewed as stewards. Stewardship 
theory (Davis et al. 1997) suggests that if franchisees are motivated as stewards, they will act 
pro-organizationally, such that the granting of greater autonomy to franchisees should have 
positive impact on the franchisor-franchisee relationship (Dada and Watson 2012). This is 
because the franchisee’s behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her franchisor 
(see Davis et al. 1997; Dada and Watson 2012). Stewardship theory therefore addresses a 
weakness of agency theory, where the latter views franchisees as agents who may have 
agency costs (such as free-riding and negative opportunistic behaviors) in situations where 
they exercise autonomy (Dada and Watson 2012).  
Tournament theory and U-curve theory (see Blut et al. 2011; Gillis et al. 2011) can be 
combined to examine if franchisors use franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy as a type of 
tournament (i.e. incentive) at different stages of the franchisee’s business lifecycle. As Gillis 
et al. (2011) explained, the premise of a tournament is to only reward agents who produce the 
highest levels of output. The authors argued that franchisors in some systems set up a 
tournament among their franchisees where franchisors identify those franchisees that are 
capable of contributing back to the franchise system through knowledge-sharing routines 
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(e.g. identifying and developing good ideas). Franchisors then reward the identified 
franchisees for their contributions by giving them additional outlets, thereby transforming 
single outlet franchisees to multiple outlet franchisees, and increasing their wealth in the 
process (Gillis et al. 2011). As the authors argued, this reward acts as an important incentive 
for franchisees to act in the franchisor’s interests. It will also be interesting for future studies 
to examine outcomes of franchisee autonomy if the latter is used as a tournament across the 
franchisee’s business lifecycle. 
Institutional theory suggests that “it is possible to predict practices within 
organizations from perceptions of legitimate behavior derived from cultural values, industry 
tradition, firm history, popular management folklore, and the like” (Eisenhardt 1988: 492). 
Scholars can draw on institutional theory to explore potential institutional influences that 
affect the level of autonomy granted to franchisees. Studies using examples of these less 
explored theories can advance understanding of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy. Indeed, 
researchers have called for greater theoretical diversity in franchise research (see Combs et 




Conclusion   
This paper contributes to knowledge by developing a broad model of core factors and 
associated secondary factors that are important for understanding franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy. The evidence highlights the superiority of agency theory in effectively studying 
most of the phenomena in the model, notably a range of influences, controls, outcomes, and 
moderating factors that contribute to the understanding of franchisee entrepreneurial 
autonomy. Although franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy may conflict with the 
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standardization required in franchise systems, the findings from the review suggest that 
franchisors foresee autonomy to occur at some point and they draw on a broad range of 
mechanisms to manage this expectancy. Contrary to what might be expected, this review 
further adds to the literature by showing that it is not just the franchisor that can control 
entrepreneurial autonomy in franchised outlets, but also the franchisee. Unlike the franchisor 
control mechanisms which reflect the franchisor’s authority, franchisee control mechanisms 
centre largely on maintaining social procedures and relationships. The findings suggest that 
the simultaneous use of control mechanisms with franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy may 
minimize negative outcomes.  
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Table 2. Strengths of the mostly used theoretical perspectives, in relation to the core factors associated with 












Captures the positive and negative outcomes of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
 
Aids understanding of the mechanisms for controlling franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy  
 
Provides knowledge on the external factors that influence franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
 
Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 
Appropriate for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisee’s perspective 
 







Captures the positive outcomes of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
 
Provides knowledge on the external factors that influence franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy 
 
Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 









Provides knowledge on the dynamics of franchisor-franchisee relations that arise as a result of franchisee autonomy 
 
Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 









Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 
 
Property rights theory 
 
 
Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 




Transaction cost theory 
 
 
Effective for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisor’s perspective 
 







Appropriate for studying the internal influencing factors of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy from the franchisee’s perspective 
 



































EXTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS 
-Industry effect, local conditions and local market 
variations 
 
INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS  
(a) Franchisor-drivers 




-Franchised governance structure  
-Plural form governance strategy 
-Nature of the franchising concept 
-Contract range 
-Franchisor’s intangible assets 




(b) Franchisee-drivers  
-Franchisee ownership structures   
-Stages of the franchisee’s lifecycle   
-Experience of the franchisee   
-Success of the franchisee’s business    
-Personalities and role perception of individual    
 franchisees   
-Partner selection criteria    
-Franchisor trust   
-Franchisee networks  











-Financial and non-financial performance 
-System-wide adaptations 
-Organizational learning 
-Competitive advantage  
-Franchisee satisfaction 



























-HR operational autonomy 


















CONTROL MECHANISMS  
(a) Formalized control mechanisms exercised by franchisors 
-Franchise contract and incentives 
-Strictly circumscribed sphere for franchisee entrepreneurial behaviors 
-Presence of franchise coordinators and franchise managers from the 









(b) Formalized and social control mechanisms exercised by franchisees 
-Franchisee cohesion 
-Franchisee representatives 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTERNAL 
MEDIATOR 
-Transfer of 
learning 
